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Abstract—Classification algorithms have been widely adopted
to detect anomalies for various systems, e.g., IoT, cloud and face
recognition, under the common assumption that the data source
is clean, i.e., features and labels are correctly set. However, data
collected from the wild can be unreliable due to careless anno-
tations or malicious data transformation for incorrect anomaly
detection. In this paper, we present a two-layer on-line learning
framework for robust anomaly detection (RAD) in the presence
of unreliable anomaly labels, where the first layer is to filter out
the suspicious data, and the second layer detects the anomaly
patterns from the remaining data. To adapt to the on-line nature
of anomaly detection, we extend RAD with additional features
of repetitively cleaning, conflicting opinions of classifiers, and
oracle knowledge. We on-line learn from the incoming data
streams and continuously cleanse the data, so as to adapt to the
increasing learning capacity from the larger accumulated data
set. Moreover, we explore the concept of oracle learning that
provides additional information of true labels for difficult data
points. We specifically focus on three use cases, (i) detecting 10
classes of IoT attacks, (ii) predicting 4 classes of task failures of
big data jobs, (iii) recognising 20 celebrities faces. Our evaluation
results show that RAD can robustly improve the accuracy of
anomaly detection, to reach up to 98% for IoT device attacks
(i.e., +11%), up to 84% for cloud task failures (i.e., +20%) under
40% noise, and up to 74% for face recognition (i.e., +28%) under
30% noisy labels. The proposed RAD is general and can be
applied to different anomaly detection algorithms.
Index Terms—Unreliable Data; Anomaly Detection; Failures;
Attacks; Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is one of the core operations for en-
forcing dependability and performance in modern distributed
systems [29], [44]. Anomalies can take various forms includ-
ing erroneous data produced by a corrupted IoT device or the
failure of a job executed in a datacenter [6], [7], [47].
Dealing with this issue has often been done in recent art
by relying on machine learning-based classification algorithms
over system logs [11], [13] or backend collected data [17],
[46]. These systems often rely on the assumption of clean
datasets from which the classifier learns to distinguish between
1 This work has been partly supported by the IRS (Initialtive de Recherche
Strate´gique) program DATE.
2 This work has been partly funded by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation NRP75 project 407540 167266 and TU Delft technology fellowship.
data corresponding to a correct execution of the system from
data corresponding to an abnormal execution of the latter (i.e.,
anomaly detection). As workloads at real systems are highly
dynamic over time, it is even more challenging to predict
anomalies that can not be easily distinguished from the system
dynamics, compared to the systems with static workloads.
In this context, a rising concern when applying classification
algorithms is the accessibility to a reliable ground truth for
anomalies [9]. Typically, anomaly data is manually annotated
by human experts and hence the generation of anomaly labels
is subject to quality variation, so-called noisy labels. For
instance, annotating service failure types for data centers is
done by operators.
However, standard machine learning algorithms typically
assume clean labels and overlook the risk of noisy labels.
Moreover, recent studies point out the increasing dirty data
attacks that can maliciously alter the anomaly labels to mislead
the machine learning models [10], [15], [18]. As a result,
anomaly detection algorithms need to capture not only anoma-
lies that are entangled with system dynamics but also the
unreliable nature of anomaly labels.
Indeed, a strong anomaly classification model can be learned
by incorporating a larger amount of datasets; however learning
from data with noisy labels can significantly degrade the
classification accuracy, even for deep neural networks, at
a non-negligible computation resource [39], [45]. Such a
concern leads us to ask the following question: how to build
an anomaly detection framework that can robustly differen-
tiate between true and noisy anomalies and efficiently learn
anomaly classification models from a succinct amount of clean
data. The immediate challenge of capturing the dynamics of
data quality lies at the fact that label qualities are not directly
observable but only via anomaly classification outcomes that
in turn are coupled with the noise level of data labels.
We extend Robust Anomaly Detector (RAD) [47], a generic
framework that continuously learns an anomaly classification
model from streams of event logs or images that are subject
to label noise. The original design of RAD is composed of
two layers of learning models, i.e., a data label model and
an anomaly classifier. The label model aims at differentiating
the label quality, i.e., noisy v.s. true labels, for each batch of
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new data and only ”clean” data points are fed in the anomaly
classifier. The anomaly classifier predicts the event outcomes
that can be in multiple classes of (non)anomalies, depending
on the specific anomaly use case. In this extension, we derive
three alternatives of RAD, namely, voting, active learning and
slimmed, which use additional information, e.g., opinions of
conflicting classifiers and queries of oracles. Moreover, we
iteratively update the prediction of historical windows such
that the weak prediction can be continuously improved the
latest model.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of RAD, we consider
three use cases, i.e., detecting 10 classes of attacks on IoT
devices [23], predicting four types of task failures for big
data processing cluster [31], [34] and recognising the 20 most
abundant celebrity faces [25] from open datasets. Our results
show that RAD can effectively and continuously cleanse the
data, i.e., selecting data streams with clean labels, and result
in better anomaly detection accuracy per additional included
data stream, compared to classifiers without continuous data
cleansing. Specifically, under 30% noise, RAD achieves up
to 98.35%, 84.72% (comparing to 96.1% and 80.92% of no
selection on dataset) for detecting IoT device attacks and
predicting cluster task failures, respectively. If we implement
RAD Active Learning on cluster dataset with the same noise
level, the final accuracy could reach to 88.1%. For face image
dataset, final accuracy of RAD Slimmed under 30% noise
achieves to 74.14% (comparing to 46.47% of no selection on
dataset). Furthermore, our study also shows that RAD is stable
even when the noise is very strong. And if we don’t have
many clean data at beginning to pre-train the model, RAD
Active Learning and RAD Active Learning Limited could still
perform very well from a very bad starting model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the motivating case studies. Sections III and
IV present the proposed RAD framework and the results of its
experimental evaluation, respectively. Section V describes the
related work, and finally, Section VI draws our conclusions
and lessons learned.
II. MOTIVATING CASE STUDIES
To qualitatively demonstrate the impact of noisy data on
anomaly detection, we use three case studies.
• Detecting IoT device attacks from inspecting network
traffic data collected from commercial IoT devices [23].
This dataset contains nine types of IoT devices which
are subject to 10 types of attacks. Specifically, we focus
on the Ecobee thermostat device that may be infected by
Mirai malware and BASHLITE malware. Here we focus
on the scenario of detecting and differentiating between
10 attacks. It is important to detect those attacks with high
accuracies against all load conditions and data qualities.
• Predicting task execution failures for big data jobs
running at a Google cluster [31], [33]. This trace contains
a month-long jobs execution record from Google clusters.
Each job contains multiple tasks, which can be terminated
into four different states: finish, fail, evict, or kill. The last
three states are considered as anomaly states. To minimise
the computational resource waste due to anomaly states,
it is imperative to predict the final execution state of task
upon their arrivals.
• Recognizing celebrity faces from photos of the Face-
Scrub dataset [25]. The set is a collection of photos
of celebrities roughly half female and half male. The
task is to recognize faces by matching each photo to
the identity of the celebrity shown on it. Here we focus
on the face recognition of the 20 celebrities with the
highest number of photos in the dataset totalling to 3.3K
images. Faces are widely used in biometric identification
systems in many security applications, e.g., access con-
trol. This makes the robustness of such systems critical.
Furthermore, this image dataset is studied also because
we want to show the broad applicability of our proposed
framework.
The details about data definition, and statistics, e.g., num-
ber of feature and number of data points, can be found
in Section IV-A. To recognize anomalies/faces in each use
case, related studies have applied different machine learning
classification algorithms, from simple ones, e.g., k-nearest
neighbour (KNN), to complex ones, e.g., deep neural networks
(DNN), under scenarios with different levels of label noise.
Here, we evaluate how the detection accuracy changes relative
to different levels of noises. We focus on offline scenarios
where we split the data in a training set affected by label
noise and a clean evaluation set.
A. Anomaly Detection
Classification models are learned from 14,000 training
records and evaluated on a clean testing dataset of 6,000
records. We specifically apply KNN, nearest centroid and
multilayer perceptron (MLP) (a.k.a feed-forward deep neural
networks) on both the IoT device attacks and the cluster task
failures. Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b summarize the accuracy results.
One can see that noisy labels clearly deteriorate the de-
tection results for both IoT attacks and task failures, across
all three classification algorithms. For standard classifiers, like
KNN and nearest centroid, the detection accuracy decays faster
than MLP that is more robust to the noisy labels. Such an
observation holds for both use cases. In IoT attacks, MLP can
even achieve a similar accuracy as the case of no label noises,
when 50% of label classes are altered.
B. Face Recognition
For face recognition we use 2,639 images with varying
degrees of label noise as the training set and 665 clean images
as the testing set. Due to the particularity of image data, we
use MLP and a specific CNN (Convolutional Neural Network)
- ResNet (Residual neural Network) [14] as classification
models. Fig. 1c shows the accuracy results under the different
label noise levels.
One can see, similar to the previous use cases, that label
noise strongly affects the performance of both classifiers,
although, the effect here is approximately linear. Moreover,
(a) Use case of IoT thermostat device attacks (b) Use case of Cluster task failures (c) Use case of Face Recogniton
Fig. 1: Impact of noisy data on anomaly classification
ResNet performs better than MLP for this dataset under any
noise level.
Above three experiments clearly show that under the pres-
ence of noisy label data, all the models are corrupted. The
stronger the noise, the worse the model’s accuracy. These cases
motivate us to design the RAD framework and its extension.
To resist the influence of noisy label data on learning process.
.
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF RAD FRAMEWORK
In this section, we will introduce the framework of RAD
along with its three extensions RAD Voting, RAD Active
Learning and RAD Slimmed. Different from other three, RAD
Slimmed is specifically designed to deal with image dataset.
All the symbols used to explain the designs are summarized
in Table I.
A. System Model
We consider a dataset that consists of several data instances.
Each data instance has f features. Each data instance belongs
to a class k, where k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}. Data instances
are either part of a pre-labeled dataset D with labels Y
used for training or non-labeled instances part of a dataset
P used for inference. Furthermore, a labeled data instance is
either correctly labeled (i.e., clean data instance), or incorrectly
labeled (i.e., noisy data instance). We use the indicator variable
qˆ to indicate clean qˆ = 1 and dirty qˆ = 0 labels. Wrong labels
can stem from several reasons ranging from subjectivity, and
data-entry errors, to malicious error injection. The quality of
a dataset D is measured as the percent of clean labeled data
instances, denoted here as Q˜.
Data instances arrive at the learning system continuously
over time in batches. Di denotes the batch of labeled data
arriving at time ti and having labels Yi. In general we denote
the time window with the subscript i. We assume that a small
initial batch of data instances D0 has only clean labels, that is
Q˜0 = 100%. Subsequent batches, include varying proportions
of noisy labels, i.e 0 < Q˜i < 100%, i > 0. For simplicity we
consider arriving batches of equal size, ∀Di, |Di| = N , but
not necessarily at regular times.
A classification request consists of a batch of non-labeled
data instances Pi for which the classifier predicts the class k
TABLE I: Symbol description
Symbol Description
L label quality predictor
C anomaly detection classifier
Di ith training data batch
D∗i ith cleansed data batch from LPi ith test data batch
Yˆi prediction of ith test data batch from C
Q˜i percent of clean labeled data of ith batch
Ui ”unclean” data of ith batch determined by L
U∗i ith cleansed data batch from CSi ”unclean” data of ith batch determined by C
S∗i data with true label from Expert of ith batch
pˆ indicator of prediction, 1 for clean, 0 for dirty
qˆ indicator of prediction, 1 for clean, 0 for dirty
of each data instance. At each batch arrival, the classification
output Yˆi is thus an array of the predicted classes for each
non-labeled data instance.
Fig. 2: RAD learning framework. Each block is a machine
learning algorithm L and C. Data used to train is represented
by colored arrows from the top. The flowchart is iterated
at every batch arrival with new labelled and unlabelled data
coming in (black arrows on the left). The labelled training data
for C is cleansed based on the label quality predicted by L.
The incoming unlabelled data is classified by C to generate
the main output (black arrow on the right).
B. Objectives and Overview of RAD Framework
We propose the RAD learning framework. Its objective is
threefold:
(i) Accurately learn a data model from noisy data.
(ii) Continuously update the learned model based on new
incoming data.
(iii) Propose a general approach that caters to different ma-
chine learning algorithms, and different application use
cases.
Fig. 2 describes the overall architecture of RAD. RAD
comprises two main components. A label quality model L
aims at discerning clean labels from dirty labels and a classifier
model C targets the specific classification task at hand.
1) Determining Data Noise: The first component of RAD
aims to determining for each data instance in D if it is correctly
or incorrectly labeled. The objective of the label quality model
is to select the most representative data instances to train a
strong classifier model. It solicits data instances with clean
labels, avoiding the pitfall that the classifier overfits the noise.
RAD uses supervised-learning algorithms to continuously train
the label quality model from accumulated predicted clean data
instances, which are highly correlated to a stronger classifier.
Li is the label quality model that is trained with data
instances received up to time ti−1, that is D0 . . .Di−1. Upon
the arrival of a new batch of data instances Di at time ti, we
use the currently learned label quality model Li to predict the
label quality qˆ for each data instance in Di by comparing the
given k and predicted class kˆLi . If they coincide, we consider
the label as clean q = 1, otherwise as dirty q = 0. Then we
build D∗i as the subset of data instances from Di with q = 1
and discard the instances with q = 0. We incorporate D∗i into
the existing training set for both the future label quality model
Li+1 and current classifier model Ci.
2) Generic Approach to Handle Dynamic Data: The sec-
ond component of RAD is the dynamic data classifier C. Ci is
trained on all the predicted clean data instances D∗ received
until time ti, that is D∗0 . . .D∗i. We assume that D0 contains
only clean data instances to kickstart the framework and use
the label quality model L0 . . .Li−1 to cleanse D1 . . .Di and
produce D∗1 . . .D∗i. Thus, the RAD learning framework uses
the batch-by-batch updated data label quality model to enrich
the training data of the classification model.
RAD follows a generic approach since the proposed classi-
fication framework can be used with any supervised machine
learning algorithm, such as SVM, KNN, random forest, nearest
centroid, DNN, etc. Moreover, RAD can be applied to a
large spectrum of different applications where noisy data
are collected and must be cleansed before used to train the
classification model. Examples are the failure detection, attack
diagnosis and face recognition illustrated in Section IV.
C. Extensions to the Base RAD
The base framework can be extended in many different
ways. Here we present three extensions addressing specific
pitfalls and opportunities.
1) Voting and History: The base RAD aims for separation
of concerns with distinctive goals for the two models. However
this approach biases the results towards the label quality model
L. Hence we want the classifier model C to also play a role
in selecting clean data instances. We do this via the voting
extension shown in Fig. 3.
Comparing to the base RAD, predicted dirty labels having
qˆ = 0 are not discarded by L but passed to C as uncertain
data U . Then the classifier C is used to further cleanse the
uncertain data to produce U∗. For each data instance in U we
predict its class kˆC using C and looking for agreement with
the given class k and the class kˆL predicted by L. We add
data instances to U∗ if either kˆC equals k, or if kˆC equals kˆL.
In the latter we replace the given class by the predicted class.
Then we incorporate both D∗ and U∗ into the training set for
the classifier model C. We also send U∗ to the label model L
to retrain for the next batch.
Fig. 3: RAD voting correction.
Batches of data instances not added to U∗i at time ti are not
immediately discarded but kept in a batch Si of inactive data.
The idea is that since the accuracy of the classifier improves
over time (see Section IV-C), we can use the new classifier to
re-evaluate old batches of inactive data and further increase the
training data. More in detail we maintain a list of the batches
of inactive data Si ordered by their size. After we finished
training a new classifier we select the two biggest batches and
re-process them via the voting system as before.
2) Active Learning: In RAD Voting we use the two models
C and L to correct labels and increase the overall amount
of data used for training aiming for improved framework
accuracy. However still not all data is used. To increase further
the amount of training data we resort to active learning, i.e.,
we ask an expert for the true class of the data instances we
are least certain about.
Fig. 4 shows the structure of RAD Active Learning. The
difference with the structure of RAD Voting is that in RAD
Active Learning we send the most uncertain data instances not
to the inactive set S but to an oracle to ask for the true label.
In RAD Active Learning, potentially every data instance will
be used to train L and C and there is no inactive data anymore.
In reality, consulting an oracle for every single uncertain data
instance might be too expensive. Hence we also consider
RAD Active Learning Limited which additionally imposes a
configurable limit on the number of queries to be asked to the
oracle at each batch arrival. If the number of uncertain data
instances exceeds this limit, we use random sampling.
Fig. 4: RAD - Active Learning.
3) RAD Slimmed: The RAD framework requires two mod-
els. Depending on the complexity of the models used the cost
of training might be excessive. Especially in scenarios relying
on complex deep neural networks, such as Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs) for image classification, it might
be to expensive and time consuming to train two models. To
reduce the computational costs we propose a slimmed version
of RAD Active Learning named RAD Slimmed. The idea is
to partially delegate the role of the label quality L model to
the oracle.
Fig. 5: RAD Slimmed.
In RAD Slimmed new data batches arrive directly at the
C model, see Fig. 5. For each data instance we compare the
given label k and to the predicted label kˆC. If they are the
same we add to D∗. If they differ we ask the oracle for the
true label (possibly within a given query budget) and add it to
S∗. To train the model for the next data batch arrival, we use
D∗ as before plus S∗ from the past two arrivals. The reasoning
is that S∗ stemming from an oracle has all correct labels and
hence we want to double the learning from these data.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we implement RAD, RAD Voting and RAD
Active Learning on IoT and Cluster datasets. Evolution of
learning accuracy under 30% and 40% noise level are reported
for all three frameworks. For RAD, impact of noise level
on final accuracy is discussed in section. IV-D. For RAD
Voting, analysis on percentage of active and active-truth data
changing over time is carried out in section. IV-G. RAD Active
Learning and its small update RAD Active Learning Limited
are explained in section. The Impact of size of initial data
batch D0 on above frameworks are studied in section. IV-I.
To demonstrate the applicability of the framework to image
dataset, RAD Slimmed is proposed, the results of RAD
Slimmed with different limitations are reported in section.IV-J.
A. Use Cases and Datasets
In order to demonstrate the general applicability of the
proposed RAD framework for anomaly detection, we consider
the following three use cases: (i) Cluster task failures , (ii) IoT
botnet attacks and (iii) Face recognition. In our experiments,
we use real data collected in cluster and IoT platforms and
real celebrity face images.
The cluster task traces comprise data instances each cor-
responding to a task with 27 features capturing information
related to static and dynamic system states, e.g. the task
start/end times, the task resource utilisations, the hosting
machine, etc. Each class is labeled based on its scheduling
state. A detailed description of the features and labels can
be found in [31]. In particular, we are interested in the four
possible termination classes: finish, fail, evict, or kill. We filter
out other classes. The resulting class distribution is dominated
by successful tasks (finish) 77.8%, followed by kill 22.0%, fail
0.2%, and evict <0.1%. Similar to [33], we aim to predict the
task outcome to reduce the resource waste and improve the
overall scheduling and system performance, e.g., in case of
lack of resources and need to kill a task, help choosing the
task with the least probability to succeed. We apply RAD to
continually train a noise-resistant model for better accuracy.
The IoT dataset comprises data instances describing 23
network packet-level statistics recursively computed over five
different time scales totalling to 115 features. This traf-
fic statistics are collected during normal operation, labeled
as benign, or under one of ten different malicious attacks
stemming from devices infected by either the BASHLITE or
Mirai malware. Malicious traffic covers mainly scanning for
vulnerable devices and various flooding attacks. The dataset
provides traces collected at different IoT devices. More details
are provided in [23]. We aim to apply RAD to build a noise-
resistant model to categorize the attacks for post fact analysis,
e.g., for threat assessment.
The FaceScrub [25] dataset is used for face recognition.
Original FaceScrub contains more than 100,000 face images
of 530 people, with about 200 images per person. Male and
Female images are almost equal. We use a subset of 3.3K
FaceScrub images to fit the limits of our compute resources.
The 3.3K images cover the 20 people which have the highest
number of images, 12 males and 8 females. FaceScrub images
were retrieved from the Internet and are taken under real-world
situations (uncontrolled conditions). We resize all images to
128*128 pixels. Name is the only annotation we use. The
face recognition system has been widely used in security
equipment. We apply RAD Slimmed to FaceScrub dataset to
show that our framework can help to build also robust face
recognition models.
The main dataset characteristics are summarized in Table II.
TABLE II: Dataset description
Use case Cluster taskfailures
IoT device
attacks FaceScrub
#trainig data
instances 60,000 33,000 2,639
#test data
instances 6,000 6,000 665
#classes K 4 11 20
#features f 27 115 128*128
data batch size 600 300 400
initial batch
D0 size 6,000 6,000 639
B. Experimental Setup
RAD is developed in Python using scikit-learn [27]. The
main performance evaluation metric is accuracy. Experiments
are carried out 3 times, results are aggregated by computing
mean.
Noise. We inject noise into the two datasets by exchanging
the true label of data instances with a random one. The
label noise is symmetric, i.e., following the noise completely
at random model [12] where a label is picked with equal
probability from all classes except the true one. The noise level
Y˜ represents the percentage of data instances with noisy labels.
We emulate time-varying noise by drawing for each new data
batch the noise level from a Gaussian distribution with 20%
standard deviation and the targeted mean level. We assume
that all data is affected by label noise, except the testing data.
Continual learning. We start with an initial data batch of
6000 data instances for the Cluster task failures and the IoT
devices dataset. Then, data instances arrive continuously in
batches of 600 (Cluster) and 300 (IoT) data instances. Both
the initial and subsequent data batches are affected by noise.
To kick-start the label and classification models in RAD we
assume to know which initial data instances are affected by
noise (no assumptions for the subsequent data batches). We
select 6000 clean data instances as the test dataset for both
use case. Test dataset will be used at the end of each epoch
to evaluate the accuracy of the trained classification model.
We show the evolution of the model accuracy over data batch
arrivals until the performance of RAD converges.
Label model. We use a multilayer perceptron to assess
the quality of each label. For IoT and Cluster dataset, the
neural network consists of two layers with 28 neurons each.
The precision and robustness of the label model are critical
to filter out the noisy/malicious labels and provide a clean
training set to the classification model. We considered different
models, but neural networks provided the best results in terms
of accuracy and stability over time. Adaboost gave excellent
accuracy when training from the initial data with ground truth,
but resulted too sensitive to the unknown noise of subsequent
data batches. Random forest is also known to be robust against
label noise [12], however its accuracy was below the neural
network one.
Classification model. We use KNN to assign the correct
class label to each data instance filtered by the label model.
We set the number of neighbours to five. Higher values can
increase the resilience of the algorithm to residual noise, but
also induce extra computational cost. The current choice stems
from good results in preliminary experiments.
Slimmed framework. For the face recognition task we
use RAD Slimmed. In this case we use ResNet [14] as
classification model. ResNet is a type of CNN architectures
which introduces residual functions to alleviate the vanishing
gradient problem in training deep neural networks improving
the classification performance.
Baselines. The proposed RAD is compared against two
baseline data selection schemes: (i) No-Sel, where all data
instances of arriving batches are used for training the classifi-
cation model; and, (ii) Opt-Sel which emulates an omniscient
agent who can perfectly distinguish between clean and noisy
labels. The two baselines are representative of the worst and
best possible data selection strategies and we expect RAD
to fall in between. In addition, we consider the Full-Clean
baseline which simulates perfectly recovered labels, i.e., all
wrong labels have been correctly identified and recovered
by, e.g., an oracle. This represents the ideal solution which
provides all clean data in each data batch.
C. Handling Dynamic Data
We start by illustrating how RAD enables to increase the
anomaly detection accuracy over time, despite the presence
of noise. Fig. 6 and 7 show the evolution of the mean and
variance of the classification accuracy achieved by RAD on
the thermostat and task failure datasets, respectively. Each
figure moreover presents results under two levels of label
noise: 30% and 40%. We compare RAD against no selection
(No-Sel) and optimal selection (Opt-Sel). One can notice that
learning from all data instances without cleansing (i.e., No-
Sel curves) gives consistently lower accuracy in all cases. For
the attacks classification on the thermostat, the accuracy even
oscillates and diverges. The performance when using RAD is
better. First because the accuracy does not diverge. Second
because it always consistently increase until it saturates. The
end accuracies are around 98% and 84% for the IoT attack and
cluster tasks datasets, respectively. While for the first dataset
the accuracy of RAD follows closely the accuracy of Opt-
Sel, for the second dataset RAD follows Opt-Sel at first but
then saturates after 40 data batch arrivals. RAD is efficient
for various classification applications, however not optimal for
all of them. Note that RAD gives also more stable results as
shown by shorter errorbars which in magnitude are in line with
(a) With data noise level of 30% (b) With data noise level of 40%
Fig. 6: Evolution of learning over time – Use case of IoT thermostat device attacks
(a) With data noise level of 30% (b) With data noise level of 40%
Fig. 7: Evolution of learning over time – Use case of Cluster task failures
the ones obtained by an ideal data cleansing. For No-Sel the
bars are significantly larger. We discuss the results for other
IoT devices in Section IV-E.
Fig. 9 presents the variations of noise over time for one run
on IoT thermostat dataset where the mean noise rate is set to
30%. Overlaid is the number of data selected by RAD and the
overlap between the selected and actually clean data. Results
highlight the sharpness of data selection and its parsimony.
In summary: (i) continual learning is advantageous com-
pared to using only the initial dataset; however, (ii) continual
learning exposes us to possible classification accuracy degra-
dation stemming from noisy labels if proper data selection
is lacking, (iii) RAD improves the classification accuracy
compared to taking all labels, (iv) the data selection of RAD
is good, and close to being optimal in some cases.
D. Evaluation of Noise Robustness of RAD
Next we investigate the impact of different noise levels on
the RAD performance in terms of classification accuracy.
Fig. 8a and 8b present the classification accuracy for various
levels of noise, ranging from 0% (all data are clean) up to 90%
for our two main reference datasets: IoT thermostat device at-
tacks and Cluster task failures. Accuracy is measured once the
learning has converged. Once again, the RAD performance is
compared to learning from all data (No-Sel) and an omniscient
data cleanser (Opt-Sel).
As illustrated in Section II, for No-Sel the noisier the data
are, the worse the classification accuracy, dropping to 20%
and 42% for the tasks and thermostat datasets, respectively.
A decreasing trend can also be found for RAD and Opt-Sel,
however the drops are significantly smaller: at most 5%. As
there is by definition no noise in Opt-Sel case, the decrease
in classification accuracy is only due to the reduction of the
overall amount of clean data to learn from. Since the data
cleansing of RAD is not perfect, the accuracy reduction is
caused by noise pollution and overall clean data reduction.
Nevertheless, the impact is small and any huge accuracy pitfall
is avoided which results in RAD’s performance being close to
Opt-Sel. We can conclude that RAD can limit the impact of
the amount of noise across a wide range of noise levels.
E. Analysis of All Datasets
Summary results are reported in Table III and Table IV. In
addition to the average accuracy after the last batch arrival,
we also underline the accuracy improvement room obtained
by comparing Full-Clean to the No-Sel, shown in the im-
(a) IoT thermostat device attacks (b) Cluster task failures
Fig. 8: Impact of data noises on RAD accuracy
Fig. 9: Data selection – Use case of IoT thermostat device
attacks with 30% noise level.
provement room column, and relative accuracy improvement
of RAD to the No-Sel strategy, shown in the improvement
column.
All results are positive, with varying magnitude depending
on the dataset. In all cases, the proposed RAD improves
between 2% to 4% the accuracy compared to blindly taking
all data instances. However, more important than the absolute
gain is the trend. For example, for the thermostat dataset, we
can observe that RAD converges over time to a stable level as
well as Opt-Sel model, but No-Sel diverges. This means that
as time goes by, No-Sel becomes worse and worse.
Even more than the benefits of continual learning might
be important the resilience to high levels of noise. Under
such levels, the classification accuracy without data cleansing
diverges for all datasets. Even if it is rare to have noise levels
of 90% or above, they might still happen for short periods of
time in case of attacks to the auto-labelling system via flooding
of malicious labels. Hence this property can be crucial for the
dependability of the auto-labelling system.
F. Limitation of RAD Framework
Though RAD works well for datasets of Cluster task failures
and IoT device attacks. We can still see the potential lim-
itations of this framework, for example: (1) the assumption
of availability of a small fraction of clean data which may
not be possible; (2) if data is coming at high rates, or the
structure of quality model becomes more complicated, training
and prediction time of first layer will slow down the system;
(3) as anomaly classifier receives only the data selected by
label model, there is a risk that the classifier model overfits to
label model. To address these issues we devised two extensions
presented in Section III-C that are evaluated in the next
subsections.
G. RAD Voting and History Extension
In the first extension we let both the label and classifier
models vote on the label quality and include the possibility to
recover instances from history to be evaluated as the models
performance improves over time.
We evaluate the accuracy of RAD Voting over time and
different noise levels in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 for the IoT
thermostat and Cluster task failures, respectively. We can see
that in the case of task failures the RAD Voting performance
is similar to the RAD performance. However, for IoT dataset,
RAD Voting converges faster than RAD, and even outperforms
Opt-Sel. This is because we correct labels in RAD Voting algo-
rithm, which increases the number training instances compared
to Opt-Sel. The higher the noise is, the more RAD Voting
outperforms Opt-Sel.
To better understand the different performance between the
two data sets let us define active A as the percent of data used
for training till time ti:
A =
i∑
k=1
|D∗k|+ |U∗k |
|Dk| .
Knowing the number of true clean labels used per batch CTi
we further define active-truth AT as the percent of true clean
active data.
AT =
i∑
k=1
CTk
|Dk|
TABLE III: Evaluation of the all algorithms for Cluster task failures datasets with 30% noise level
Algorithm Initialaccuracy No-Sel Opt-Sel Full-Clean
Proposed
algorithm
Improvement
room Improvement
RAD 80.83% 80.92% 87.57% 88.43% 84.72% 7.51% 3.8%
RAD Voting 81.12% 80.85% 87.65% 88.31% 84.0% 7.46% 3.15%
RAD Active Learning 80.43% 79.56% 87.43% 88.27% 88.1% 8.71% 8.54%
RAD Active Learning Limited 80.87% 79.71% 87.8% 87.95% 87.35% 8.24% 7.64%
TABLE IV: Evaluation of the all algorithms for IoT device attacks datasets with 30% noise level
Algorithm Initialaccuracy No-Sel Opt-Sel Full-Clean
Proposed
algorithm
Improvement
room Improvement
RAD 94.75% 96.1% 98.35% 98.27% 98.1% 2.17% 2.0%
RAD Voting 95.25% 95.32% 98.08% 98.47% 98.07% 3.15% 2.75%
RAD Active Learning 95.53% 95.21% 98.23% 98.43% 98.41% 3.22% 3.2%
RAD Active Learning Limited 95.23% 95.67% 98.27% 98.5% 98.45% 2.83% 2.78%
(a) Iot data with noise level of 30% (b) Iot data with noise level of 40%
Fig. 10: Evolution of learning over time – Use case of IoT thermostat device attacks with RAD Voting
(a) Cluster data with noise level of 30% (b) Cluster data with noise level of 40%
Fig. 11: Evolution of learning over time – Use case of Cluster task failures with RAD Voting
In both formulas, we exclude the initial clean batch D0.
Intuitively, A tells how much of the incoming data we use
for training, and AT shows how clean the used training data
is.
Fig. 12(a) and (b) plot over time these two metrics for
the IoT and task failures datasets, respectively. As seen in
Fig. 12(a), for the IoT dataset both A and AT improve over
time. This means that the active data percentage both the
amount of active data, i.e. A, and the quality of active data
AT improve over time. On the contrary, looking at Fig. 12(b),
for the Cluster dataset AT does not improve over time even
if A increases. We impute this to the fact that both C and L
predict the same wrong class and this class is used to replace
the original label of the data instance.
(a) Iot data with noise level of 30% (b) Cluster data with noise level of 30%
Fig. 12: Active and active-truth – voting
Table III and Table IV summarize and compare the RAD
Voting performance to the performance of RAD and the
other extensions for the Cluster and IoT datasets. One thing
to note in these two tables is that the values within the
columns: Initial accuracy, No-Sel, Opt-Sel and Full-Clean
should theoretically be the same, respectively. However due to
the random initialization of the parameters of machine learning
models, there are always minor differences between runs.
H. RAD Active Learning
RAD Active Learning extends the RAD with the ability
of asking an oracle to provide the true label for the data
instances where the two models do not agree. First we consider
RAD Active Learning with no limits on the number of oracle
requests followed by RAD Active Learning Limited which
limits the number of oracle interactions.
Fig. 14 and Fig. 13 show the performance of RAD Active
Learning for the IoT and Cluster datasets, respectively. The
figures compare RAD Active Learning to two baselines: Opt-
Sel and Full-Clean. We can see that RAD Active Learning is
almost as good as Full-Clean across the two different datasets
and different noise levels. Moreover, this is accomplished by
consulting the oracle for only about 35% (30% noise level)
and 39% (40% noise level) of the data instances (not counting
the initial clean batch D0).
In reality consulting every single uncertain data instance
with expert might be too expensive. Hence we consider
RAD Active Learning Limited which limits the capacity of
consultation with expert. Table III and Table IV summarize and
compare the results of RAD Active Learning and RAD Active
Learning Limited with a 20% limit for the two datasets. The
results show that limiting the consultations degrades slightly
the performance compared to RAD Active Learning, but it is
still very close to Full-Clean. This stems from the fact that
most data instances we select to send to the oracle are indeed
instances affected by label noise and we use the oracle to
correct these. Without our framework to filter out the uncertain
data, we would not know which data labels are noisy. So we
can either give the whole dataset to the oracle to clean up
the dataset which likely is expensive, or randomly select a
limited number of data instances and acknowledge that some
consultations will be wasted on already clean data instances.
I. Impact of Initialization
Here we study the impact on the RAD and its extensions of
the amount of available ground truth data, i.e., the size of the
initial dataset D0. We vary the number of initial clean data
instances from 100 to 6000, and measure the classification
accuracy after 90 data batch arrivals. Her we consider the
Opt-Sel baseline since the No-Sel baseline is meant for the
framework configuration, not its performance evaluation.
In Fig. 15a and Fig. 15b show the results for the IoT and
Cluster datasets, respectively.
In both figures Opt-Sel is quite independent from the
number of initial data instances (|D0|). This is due to the
fact that after 90 batch arrivals the amount of training data
is enough to be in the accuracy saturation region. However
for RAD and RAD Voting, the size of D0 does matter: the
larger the better. At |D0| = 3000 their performances are close
to Opt-Sel for IoT dataset, and at |D0| = 6000 they completely
overlap. RAD Voting outperforms RAD in both datasets when
D0 is 100. This is because RAD Voting can correct data labels
increasing the number of training instances. Finally, RAD
Active Learning and RAD Active Learning Limited (20%
limit) do not depend on the size of D0, since they can ask
the oracle for the label of uncertain data instances.
This justifies our earlier choice of D0 having 6000 data
instances as it enables to achieve the best accuracy. However,
all proposed frameworks could also perform well with only
half of the data instances in D0.
J. RAD Slimmed on Image Data
We conclude our evaluation section by testing our frame-
work with image data using RAD Slimmed to labelling a
subset of FaceScrub face images with the celebrity name. We
allow 120 consultations with the oracle for each batch of 400
data instances, i.e., 30%. Fig. 16 shows the accuracy results
across the batch arrivals. We can observe that RAD Slimmed
is close to the Full-Clean baseline. Another thing we could
(a) Cluster data with noise level of 30% (b) Cluster data with noise level of 40%
Fig. 13: Evolution of learning over time – active learning
(a) Iot data with noise level of 30% (b) Iot data with noise level of 40%
Fig. 14: Evolution of learning over time – active learning
notice is that all three curves suffer a periodic up-down pattern.
This is because each time a new batch comes, we only use this
new batch data as training dataset. As different batches provide
different subviews of the data the empirical distribution can
be different as well as the calculated optimum, but the model
remains. So for the first epoch of a new batch, we will generate
a gradient which is based on new data but applied on an old
model. This can influence the accuracy of the model. Moreover
when retraining on each new data batch we reset the learning
rate which causes a bump in the learning rate. Therefore, even
if all batches follow the same distribution, the system could
temporarily wander off from the previous optimum.
More complete results are showed in Table V with varying
consultation limits. We see that increasing the consultations
limit allows the final accuracy to get closer and closer to Full-
Clean. The difference between No-Sel and 0% is that No-Sel
uses directly the noisy label data to train the classifier, whereas
0% uses the classifier to filter the uncertain data instances, but
it is not allowed to send it to the oracle for consultation.
V. RELATED WORK
Machine learning has been extensively used for failure de-
tection [8], [28], [30], [32], attack prediction [1], [3], [4], [19],
[20], [48], and face recognition [35], [37], [42]. Considering
noisy labels in classification algorithms is also a problem
that has been explored in the machine learning community
as discussed in [5], [12], [24].
The problem of classification in presence of noisy labels can
be organized into various categories according to, on the one
hand, the type of classification algorithm subject to noise, and
on the other hand, the techniques used to remove the noise.
Regarding the type of classification algorithm, the problem
of noisy labels has been studied both for binary classification
where noisy labels are considered as symmetric (e.g., [21]) and
for classification with multiple classes where noisy labels are
considered as asymmetric, e.g., [26], [36]. In the context of this
paper, we consider the problem of classification with multiple
classes. Furthermore, noisy labels have been considered in
various types of classifiers KNN [43], SVM [2], and deep
neural networks [40]. In the context of this paper, our proposed
approach is agnostic to the underlying classifier type as noise
removal is performed ahead of the classification.
To deal with noise, various techniques have been explored
including forward loss correction. These algorithms learn
about the label noise by adjusting the loss to the end of
the model. However, these solutions either rely on strong
assumptions or have limited accuracy as they generally do
(a) IoT thermostat device attacks (b) Cluster task failures
Fig. 15: Impact of size of initial data batch D0 on RAD accuracy with 30% noise level
TABLE V: Evaluation of the RAD Active Learning Limited for FaceScrub with different limits per batch
Initial
accuracy No-Sel Opt-Sel
Full-
Clean 0% 10% 20% 30%
63.61% 46.47% 80.15% 84.36% 48.72% 66.32% 70.68% 74.14%
Fig. 16: FaceScrub with noise level of 30%
not rely on clean labels to remove the noise. More accurate
solutions, which rely on clean labels during the training phase
have thus been explored (e.g., [16], [22], [41]). These solutions
generally train a separate network for distinguishing noisy
labels from clean ones. Robustness to label noise has also
been studied for GANs performing image recognition, both
in the context of known and unknown noise distribution [38].
However, all these solutions have been designed and tested on
static datasets and in an off-line setting. Instead in the context
of this paper, we consider a dynamic model where the network
has been trained using cleaned labels continues to learn over
time.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While machine learning classification algorithms are widely
applied to detect anomalies, the commonly employed assump-
tion of clean anomaly labels often does not hold for the data
collected in the wild due to careless annotation and malicious
dirty label pollution. The noisy labels can significantly degrade
the accuracy of anomaly detection with an increasing amount
of data and are challenging to tackle due to the lack of
ground truth of label quality. In this paper, we present a on-
line framework for robust anomaly detection, RAD, which
can continuously learn the system dynamics and anomaly
behaviours from streams of arriving data after filtering out
suspicious noisy data.
RAD is a general framework that composes of sequence of
quality and classification models, where the former captures
the label dynamics and the latter focus on detection anomaly.
To overome the limtations of on-line learning, the additional
features of RAD are repeatitively cleaninsing and oracle
queries which are based on the learning capacity varying
over time. We demonstrate the effectiveness of RAD on three
uses cases, i.e., detecting IoT device attacks, predicting task
failure at Google clusters and recognising celebrity faces using
FaceScrub. RAD can robustly improve the detection accuracy
against different levels of label noises, reaching up to 74%,
83% and 98% accuracy for recognising face, predicting task
failure and detecting IoT device attacks, respectively, whereas
learning directly from all the data streams without filtering
degrades the detection accuracy.
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